File openssl-add-blinding-to-dsa.patch of Package openssl1

From 41d23d435221411b4d70c08b6c5424d0afcf4c19 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2018 15:07:02 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Add blinding to a DSA signature

This extends the recently added ECDSA signature blinding to blind DSA too.

This is based on side channel attacks demonstrated by Keegan Ryan (NCC
Group) for ECDSA which are likely to be able to be applied to DSA.

Normally, as in ECDSA, during signing the signer calculates:

s:= k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod order

In ECDSA, the addition operation above provides a sufficient signal for a
flush+reload attack to derive the private key given sufficient signature
operations.

As a mitigation (based on a suggestion from Keegan) we add blinding to
the operation so that:

s := k^-1 * blind^-1 (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod order

Since this attack is a localhost side channel only no CVE is assigned.

This commit also tweaks the previous ECDSA blinding so that blinding is
only removed at the last possible step.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6524)
---
 CHANGES                 |  4 +--
 crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c   | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
 crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c | 14 +++++-----
 3 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)

Index: openssl-1.0.1g/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-1.0.1g.orig/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c	2018-08-10 17:35:38.017358212 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1g/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c	2018-08-10 17:35:38.473360978 +0200
@@ -131,17 +131,13 @@ const DSA_METHOD *DSA_OpenSSL(void)
 static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
 	{
 	BIGNUM *kinv=NULL,*r=NULL,*s=NULL;
-	BIGNUM m;
-	BIGNUM xr;
+	BIGNUM *m, *blind, *blindm, *tmp;
 	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
 	int reason=ERR_R_BN_LIB;
 	DSA_SIG *ret=NULL;
 	int noredo = 0;
 
-	BN_init(&m);
-	BN_init(&xr);
-
-	if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g)
+	if (dsa->p == NULL || dsa->q == NULL || dsa->g == NULL)
 		{
 		reason=DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS;
 		goto err;
@@ -151,6 +147,12 @@ static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsign
 	if (s == NULL) goto err;
 	ctx=BN_CTX_new();
 	if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
+  m = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  blind = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  blindm = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  if (tmp == NULL)
+    goto err;
 redo:
 	if ((dsa->kinv == NULL) || (dsa->r == NULL))
 		{
@@ -165,24 +167,57 @@ redo:
 		noredo = 1;
 		}
 
-	
+
 	if (dlen > BN_num_bytes(dsa->q))
 		/* if the digest length is greater than the size of q use the
 		 * BN_num_bits(dsa->q) leftmost bits of the digest, see
 		 * fips 186-3, 4.2 */
 		dlen = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q);
-	if (BN_bin2bn(dgst,dlen,&m) == NULL)
+	if (BN_bin2bn(dgst,dlen,m) == NULL)
 		goto err;
 
-	/* Compute  s = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q */
-	if (!BN_mod_mul(&xr,dsa->priv_key,r,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err;/* s = xr */
-	if (!BN_add(s, &xr, &m)) goto err;		/* s = m + xr */
-	if (BN_cmp(s,dsa->q) > 0)
-		if (!BN_sub(s,s,dsa->q)) goto err;
+	/*
+	 * The normal signature calculation is:
+	 *
+	 *   s := k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod q
+	 *
+	 * We will blind this to protect against side channel attacks
+	 *
+	 *   s := blind^-1 * k^-1 * (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod q
+	 */
+
+	  /* Generate a blinding value */
+	  do {
+	    if (!BN_rand(blind, BN_num_bits(dsa->q) - 1, -1, 0))
+	        goto err;
+	  } while (BN_is_zero(blind));
+		BN_set_flags(blind, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+		BN_set_flags(blindm, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+		BN_set_flags(tmp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+    /* tmp := blind * priv_key * r mod q */
+		if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, blind, dsa->priv_key, dsa->q, ctx))
+		   goto err;
+		if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, tmp, r, dsa->q, ctx))
+		   goto err;
+
+    /* blindm := blind * m mod q */
+    if (!BN_mod_mul(blindm, blind, m, dsa->q, ctx))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* s : = (blind * priv_key * r) + (blind * m) mod q */
+    if (!BN_mod_add_quick(s, tmp, blindm, dsa->q))
+       goto err;
+
+  /* s := s * k^-1 mod q */
 	if (!BN_mod_mul(s,s,kinv,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
 
-	ret=DSA_SIG_new();
-	if (ret == NULL) goto err;
+  /* s:= s * blind^-1 mod q */
+  if (BN_mod_inverse(blind, blind, dsa->q, ctx) == NULL)
+     goto err;
+if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, blind, dsa->q, ctx))
+    goto err;
+
 	/* Redo if r or s is zero as required by FIPS 186-3: this is
 	 * very unlikely.
 	 */
@@ -195,9 +230,11 @@ redo:
 			}
 		goto redo;
 		}
+	ret=DSA_SIG_new();
+	if (ret == NULL) goto err;
 	ret->r = r;
 	ret->s = s;
-	
+
 err:
 	if (!ret)
 		{
@@ -205,11 +242,8 @@ err:
 		BN_free(r);
 		BN_free(s);
 		}
-	if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-	BN_clear_free(&m);
-	BN_clear_free(&xr);
-	if (kinv != NULL) /* dsa->kinv is NULL now if we used it */
-	    BN_clear_free(kinv);
+	BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+	BN_clear_free(kinv);
 	return(ret);
 	}