File openssl-CVE-2014-3507.patch of Package openssl1

commit 9871417fb74dca48ea1dc85ae666a6529d113ff8
Author: Adam Langley <agl@imperialviolet.org>
Date:   Fri Jun 6 14:30:33 2014 -0700

Fix memory leak from zero-length DTLS fragments.
    
    The |pqueue_insert| function can fail if one attempts to insert a
    duplicate sequence number. When handling a fragment of an out of
    sequence message, |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message| would not call
    |dtls1_reassemble_fragment| if the fragment's length was zero. It would
    then allocate a fresh fragment and attempt to insert it, but ignore the
    return value, leaking the fragment.
    
    This allows an attacker to exhaust the memory of a DTLS peer.
    
    Fixes CVE-2014-3507
    
    Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
    Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Index: openssl-1.0.1g/ssl/d1_both.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-1.0.1g.orig/ssl/d1_both.c	2014-08-11 11:24:23.809942582 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1g/ssl/d1_both.c	2014-08-11 11:24:23.815942650 +0200
@@ -611,6 +611,9 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct
 	    msg_hdr->msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
 		goto err;
 
+	if (frag_len == 0)
+		return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
+
 	/* Try to find item in queue */
 	memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
 	seq64be[6] = (unsigned char) (msg_hdr->seq>>8);
@@ -686,7 +689,12 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct
 			i = -1;
 			}
 
-		pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+		item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+		/* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
+		 * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
+		 * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it and control
+		 * would never have reached this branch. */
+		OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
 		}
 
 	return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
@@ -744,7 +752,7 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s,
 		}
 	else
 		{
-		if (frag_len && frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len)
+		if (frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len)
 			return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr, ok);
 
 		if (frag_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
@@ -773,7 +781,15 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s,
 		if ( item == NULL)
 			goto err;
 
-		pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+		item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+		/* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
+		 * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
+		 * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it. Then, either
+		 * |frag_len| != |msg_hdr->msg_len| in which case |item| is set
+		 * to NULL and it will have been processed with
+		 * |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, above, or the record will have
+		 * been discarded. */
+		OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
 		}
 
 	return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;